MEMORANDUM FOR:

THIS IS THE OUTLINE
TO THE TROPOSED NPIC MANUPL THAT YOU FLEST ASKED

FOR ON 22 DECEMBER

WOULD LIKE
TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU APTENZ YOU HANE READ IT. THE
ATTACHED CARD 7 JULY
GINES BACKGROUND (DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
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Declass Review by NGA.

# SECRET

## Approved For Release 2004/02/11 : CIA-RDP78B05709A000200070047-6

7 July 1970

25X1	FROM : OTR/SIWA
25X1	TO : Executive Director, NPIC
	SUBJECT: Draft Outline of Training Manual on the Analysis of Imagery for Intelligence Purposes
	1. The draft outline of the <u>Training Manual on the Analysis of Imagery</u> for <u>Intelligence Purposes</u> has not been seen by the Director of Training, and he might want to make some changes in it. However, it is based upon discussions I have had with him and does, I believe, incorporate those points he wants made.
	2. Simply to expedite matters, I have forwarded the draft to you for your examination and comment first. I also feel that I should touch base with IAS before going back to with a more firm outline. 25X
フ	3. The Manual, as I see it, should not try to be encyclopedic, nor should it try to be a how-to-do-it bookthat is much better done elsewhere. The Manual will serve all concerned well if it accurately reflects the current state of affairs as it affects the analysis of imagery. I believe NPIC's contributions can be effectively and honestly presented within the context of this outline.
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Draft Outline for Projected Training Manual on the Analysis of Imagery for Intelligence Purposes

#### I. Introduction

but classification

The value of imagery as a source of intelligence information

- 1. Examples (use of World War II, and a modern example)
- B. History of modern photo interpretation
  - 1. Lessons learned from experience


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- a. The value of "consecutive cover"
- b. Introduction of a three-phase exploitation procedure
- c. Recognition of the need for a central photo reconnaissance and interpretation command--a principle not revived until years later, and then only partially
- 2. Early collection efforts in the Cold War
  - a. GENETRIX
  - b. SENSINT missions
- 3. The mounting of the U-2 effort
  - a. Convergence of the technical means and the imagination make it possible
- 4. Surprising success, and others join in
  - a. Beginnings of joint CIA service interpretation efforts
- 5. The Kirkpatrick Committee, NSCID #8, and NPIC
  - a. NPIC received its charter of pre-eminence
- 6. The Cuban missile crisis--an outstanding performance in photo interpretation
- 7. JIIRG looks at imagery collection and exploitation
  - a. COMMEX replaces COMOR
    - (1) More direct control assumed over both collection and exploitation
    - (2) Unconventional imagery attracts formal attention
  - b. The National Tasking Plan--a logical attempt to divide the burden of exploitation

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- C. The National Tasking Plan--a rational design for exploitation in process of being overtaken by events.
  - 1. Events generate pressures for everyone to do more and more as more and more becomes available--result: original design is being altered in fact.
- II. Where are we now? Problems



- 1. Ability to collect far exceeds ability to fully exploit--reasons
  - a. Collection has been mechanized and automated far more successfully than has exploitation
    - (1) Exploitation depends on human resources very early in the process
    - (2) Hoped-for help from pattern-recognition devices
    - (3) Other technical aids to exploitation
- 2. Ability to collect spawns requirements to collect
  - a. Ability to collect micro-detail is a mixed blessing
    - (1) Argument that micro-detail will always significantly increase accuracy of intelligence obtained is persistent and often difficult to counter
  - b. "Consecutive cover" how much is too much?
    - (1) CIA and DIA at some disagreement over this
- 3. Attempts to keep the appetite for collection of imagery in line with the ability to digest it--a continuing story (should fill in with some detail here)
- III. The consumers of information obtained from the analysis of imagery--the prime generators of requirements for collection and exploitation
  - $\Lambda$ . Who uses information from the analysis of imagery?
    - 1. No composite description is possible
    - 2. Producers of finished intelligence are the largest consumers
    - 3. Operational components

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- R. What uses are made of information from imagery?
  - 1. Three case studies of information use for production of finished intelligence:
    - a. By OER
    - b. By OSR
    - e. By OCI
  - 2. Two case studies of information used for operational purposes (might have FI/Staff contribute this)
- C. How do users of this information convey their needs to those responsible for exploiting the imagery?
  - 1. Exploitation requirements
    - a. How are exploitation requirements levied upon NPIC and IAS?
      - (1) The role of IRS
      - (2) The role of FI/Staff
    - b. What should a good exploitation requirement include?
      - (1) Specifics about the format or enough detail about the use to be made of the product to enable the producer to respond effectively
      - (2) Specifics about the area and/or subject
      - (3) Specific deadline information
      - (4) Specific classification/control information, if applicable
      - (5) Limits on the coverage dates of imagery to the covoloited.
  - 2. The in rmol channels
    - a. The "posite number" relationship-good if it doesn't get in the way of the normal work-load
- 1). Trends among consumers in exploitation requirements (NPIC and/or IAS to contribute)
- IV. What is a "proper" use of imagery for intelligence purposes?
  - A. The counting/measuring application.
    - 1. When is counting and measuring irrelevant?
      - a. When there is nothing to count or measure
      - b. When the values are already known

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- B. The early warning function
  - 1. Timeliness of coverage and exploitation are essential
    - a. Good guidance from collection and exploitation requirements plays vital roles
  - 2. The impossibility of knowing the unknowable (at least two examples)
- C. To give the insider's view of new developments
  - 1. Good luck with an assist from good planning plays a part (give at least one example)
- D. To confirm or validate other intelligence
  - 1. The imagery test for a defector's area report
- E. To suggest new conclusions by convergence or congruence with other intelligence information
  - V. What kinds of analysis products can be obtained?
    - A. The serially-produced reports in response to standing requirements (enumerate and describe at least the major ones)
    - B. The one-of-a-kind report, self-initiated by the producer (as above)
    - C. Models, briefing boards, etc. (describe some)
    - The specifically designed report in response to a specific exploitation requirement from a consumer (describe some)

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VI. How does NPIC organize itself to do its job? (NPIC to contribute this chapter)

VII. How does IAS organize itself to do its job? (IAS to contribute this chapter)

## **JE**URE I

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## Appendix

List  $\xi$  simple facts about the other 41 (?) government agencies doing analysis of imagery.